Selected Military Papers
and Essays of
Colonel John Osgood, USAR Retired
This is an index with a brief summary from which you can
link to articles written by Colonel John
Osgood, Retired. Colonel Osgood is a Vietnam veteran with combat
experience who also served as a member of the General Staff of
Engineer Command in the Persian Gulf. He is a graduate of the
College and retired with more than 31 years of total active and
service. He is a criminal
defense attorney in the Kansas City, Missouri metro area.
NOTICE: These are papers written by the author based on his
own research and
interest in the subjects indicated. Nothing contained in any of
papers, or essays should be construed as stating official United
States policy or
Department of the Army policy on any issue. These represent the
views and opinions on the issues and these are not official
Department of the
Army documents. They are presented to simply stimulate
and debate on the issues.
Click on the hyperlink to read full article
United States Nuclear Strategy 1945-1995 - W14
Evolution of United States
nuclear strategy beginning with the Truman administration and
concluding with a discussion of current nuclear policies and
doctrine, including a discussion of the controversial Strategic
Discuss the major provisions of the
Goldwater-Nichols act and explores how these provisions have
improved and enhanced the management and administration of the
United States Department of Defense.
Paper discusses strategic visions for the U.S. Armed Forces
in the year 2020. Attempts to project military requirements
next century and what strategy the US should pursue.
Examines the U.S. policy and strategy as
developed and applied in the Persian Gulf War and its application
to the doctrine espoused by former Secretary Weinberger in 1985,
vis a vis doctrine intended to provide guidance for
application of force in settings ranging from full scale nuclear
war to limited involvement in potentially low intensity conflicts
This historical article looks at the three major strategic
considerations that shaped "Europe first strategy" during World
War II; coalition warfare, technology, and resources; how the
strategy actually was implemented; and, how such strategy might
be viewed in the context of theoretical doctrine as espoused by
Clausewitz and other authorities. It covers the
period prior to the U.S. entry into the war and discuss events
leading to the execution of Operation Overlord.
The Four Categories of Low
Intensity Conflict (LIC) - wc8
Article describes the four categories of Low
Intensity Conflict (LIC), examines one in detail, and concludes
with discussion of unique roles, missions, and capabilities
that special operations forces (SOF) would contribute to the
CINC's campaign plan execution in a hypothetical Libya campaign.
This paper will explore the possible nature of the next
"small war" or "Low Intensity Conflict" (LIC) in which the United
States is likely to become embroiled, whether such a conflict is
likely to be a multi-force operation, and how such a conflict
might impact on the United States, its people, and,
the military forces that will be called upon to conduct it. Note: In
light of the current state of world affairs this article is more timely than
perhaps I could have ever guessed.
A discussion of common threads that exist
within the proposed doctrinal concepts of the Army
This historical article looks at Operation OVERLORD in
of the strategic and operational setting; examines campaign
maneuvers, operational fires, and logistics; and concludes with a
discussion of lines of operation as it applied in that situation.
Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D.
Eisenhower. -- Contrasts in Leadership - wc2
This article discusses the strategic leadership strengths
and weaknesses of Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D.
Eisenhower. The primary source for biographical information was
Commander in Chief by Eric Larrabee. For contrast I
relied on William Manchester's biography of MacArthur,
American Caesar, and Eisenhower at War 1943-1945 by
Title is self-explanatory
Article defines "center of gravity"
and the relationship between it and
vulnerabilities. It also explains the distinction between
the strategic and operational level of center of gravity.
Paper compares and contrasts the strategic writings of
Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini, 19th Century
strategists. Discusses geo-political forces and individual
instrumental in shaping each theorist's hypothesis about war.
Paper discusses the operational strategy employed by
General Grant during his campaign in the West and focuses on his
capture of Vicksburg in July, 1863.
John Lewis Gaddis hypothesizes that the end of
the Cold War and the demise of clear geopolitical division and
confrontation between East and West has resulted in the emergence
of a contest between two major competing forces in the
international environment, "integration" and "fragmentation." He
argues that our "involvement" in the post-cold war global arena
i.e., the grand strategy we should pursue, should depend largely
on which of these forces emerges as dominant.