Grant's Operational Strategy at Vicksburg

by

Colonel John Osgood, Retired (c) 1994-1998

This paper will analyze the operational strategy employed by General Grant during his campaign in the West and focus on his capture of Vicksburg in July, 1863. It will examine how this strategy furthered the national grand strategy of defeating the Confederates and preserving the Union (the ultimate objective of the civil war) by use of the "ends, ways, and means" model. Note 1.

As Klein points out in The Contest for the Mississippi, Lincoln was convinced that one of the keys to defeating the South with its agrarian cotton based economy was to split the Confederacy by taking Tennessee and its key rail lines and then taking the Mississippi valley and controlling the Mississippi River. The task ultimately fell to Grant.

Grant, described as "a man of serious, self-contained, determined bearing," was a confident yet humble leader who "demonstrated consistent, unflinching courage, both physical and moral." After initial successes along the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers (capture of Forts Donelson and Henry and key rail lines in 1862), followed by setbacks and near defeat of Union forces by General Johnston at Shilo (Pittsburg Landing), Grant was appointed Commander of the Department of Tennessee and ordered to take Vickburg. Note 2.

Grant's plan and the way he would execute it was simple but brilliant. Rather than engage the rebels in a costly frontal assault on Snyder's or Haynes' Bluffs, an unpleasant prospect in light of prior setbacks, he would merely take his army down stream on the west side of the river, cross over at New Carthage between Warrenton and Grand Gulf, and assault Vicksburg from the south, and, at the same time, sever the key rail line between Jackson and Vicksburg. The ultimate strategic ends achieved would include the fall of Vicksburg, the opening of the Mississippi, and the resultant severing of the Confederacy. The immediate operational objective or end achieved would be accomplishment of the mission with potentially far less casualties on both sides.

Grant's resources, that is, the means at his disposal included naval gun boats and supply ships he could send down stream to use in support of his river crossing, Farragut's naval presence on the lower Mississippi, Banks's pressure on Port Hudson and the lower valley, and significant Union troop strengths which were readily deployable in support of the operation. Negative aspects included lack of confidence in the operation by his key subordinates; distrust of the abilities of his point Corps Commander, McClernand; the necessity to forage for supplies once fully committed; and, the prospect that failure of the operation also meant loss of significant naval presence on the upper Mississippi, since the gun boats would not be able to return up river to resume operations north of Vicksburg. Failure also carried significant political implications since the war was not progressing well in the East. Note 3.

Although termed "unmilitary," Grant's campaign is a classic example of strategy and genius (Clausewitz's great intangible) at its best in which calculated risks are taken (ways) using all available resources (means) to achieve decisive victory (ends). One is instantly drawn to parallels in history such as Hanibal's land based attack on the Roman Empire by way of Spain and Gual and his innovative use of elephants to cross the Alps and enter Italy from a totally unexpected avenue of approach. On a smaller scale, Washington's crossing of the Delaware under extremely adverse conditions on Christmas 1776 and his subsequent surprise attack on Trenton is another example of such genius where a fine balance is struck between ends, ways and means. Napoleon's uncanny ability to flank and envelope his enemy (Jena campaign in 1806), surprise him, and shatter his lines of communications are equally illustrative of the importance of operational strategy and a keen understanding of the dynamics of Lykke's model.

Footnotes:

1. Lykke says military strategy has three elements. "[It] consists of the establishment of military objectives [ends], the formulation of military strategic concepts [ways] to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military resources [means] to implement the concepts." If the elements are not balanced, operational success, or worse, national security, may suffer.

2. This followed the advance on Corinth, a nonaggressive operation under the direct command of General Halleck (Grant commanded a Corps). It was during this period that Grant was unfairly accused of heavy drinking and his abilities questioned. In reality, Halleck probably restrained Grant. Indeed, he had only reluctantly agreed to Grant's successful Tennessee campaigns.

3. The operation, which Sherman had described as "unmilitary," was executed as planned, with minor deviation, and was decisive (Sherman's contribution included a key feigning attack on the bluffs). The Union army moved from Milliken's Bend south through the swamps and crossed the river south of Grand Gulf, marched northeastward, and divided Pemberton's and Johnston's forces at Vicksburg and Jackson. Jackson was captured May 14th and after a 47 day siege, Vicksburg capitulated on July 4, 1863. Thus, Grant cut the enemy lines of operations (ways) and achieved all objectives (ends) with maximum utilization of the means at his disposal.

 


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