The Goldwater Nichols Act - Managing the Defense Department

by

Colonel John Osgood, Retired (c) 1996

This paper will discuss the major provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols act and explore how these provisions have improved and enhanced the management and administration of the United States Department of Defense. Some current and historical situations will be examined to see whether the statutory amendments have in fact resulted in actual meaningful change.

A former Vice Chairman of the JCS, General Herres, notes that the intent of the act is simple and direct -- "increase the clout of the commanders in chief [CINC's] and of the chairman!" The act is, in Admiral Herres's words, "another evolutionary step" in developing a cohesive fighting force and a system of command and control that ensures that the President and the Secretary of Defense always receive the best possible military advice and that the advice is then translated into effective strategy on the battle field by the CINC's.

Prior to the 1986 legislation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned as a corporate body, providing collective guidance to the National Command Authority. The 1986 legislation further defines the duties of the Secretary of Defense and his function within the chain of command and his authority over the Service Secretaries. The act designates the Chairman, who can now serve three terms, as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council and creates the position of Vice Chairman. It reduces significantly the role of the corporate JCS as an entity (The JCS members are still military advisors; however, and any individual member may submit individual advise when that member disagrees with the Chairman). The Chairman now has a more direct involvement in the preparation of strategic plans, contingency plans and net assessments; he provides advice to the Secretary on other important issues such as programs and budgets and doctrine for the joint employment of forces; and, he coordinates with the Service Secretaries on a wide range of issues, including training and education of the armed forces.

As mentioned above, the act also strengthens the powers of the Unified and Specified Commanders and places a greater emphasis on the necessity for joint duty and the development of joint specialties by those who have come to be known in military parlance as "purple suiters." In the past, the power and influence of the corporate JCS body has, to some extent, depended on the personalities of those in office. The Goldwater-Nichols act clearly spells out that the operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the field CINC's, taking collective personality out of the equation. While Congress had difficulty agreeing on whether the forces assigned to these commands would be OPCON to the CINC or under his "full command," the powers are sufficiently defined by statute so that there is little question as to the clear authority of the CINC over the subordinate forces within his command.

Katherine Boo ("How Congress Won the War in the Gulf"), quoting a Brooking Institution study, agrees the act was "one of the primary contributing factors to our success" in the Gulf. Boo says there is considerable irony in this, since the act was soundly condemned by military insiders and even called "unpatriotic" by some of the service chiefs who had an obvious vested interest in maintaining and promoting their own parochial interests. Boo says that for the first time in a major confrontation, the field commander, General Schwarzkopf, had real command and control over his unified command. For example, the CINC was able to effectively employ air power to the maximum since LTG Horner, the air commander, controlled all air assets in the theater, including Navy forces, thereby eliminating fragmented uncoordinated strategy. The Support Command, under the command of LTG Pagonis, provided theater wide supply, while a unified single transportation command successfully moved 500,000 troops and millions of tons of equipment and ammunition into the theater in record time. During the operation, the CINC, by all accounts, was not burdened with mixed signals from the Pentagon and command and control flowed smoothly from the President through the Secretary and the Chairman as envisioned by the act. Note 1.

"Jointness" is now legally mandated by statute. The excerpt from Raines and Campbell ("The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff") demonstrates the wisdom of this legislation. The article provides an excellent account of the growing pains suffered by the Services and their respective reluctance to yield power and control over their own service destinies because of inherent parochial service interests. Those concepts of military oneness fought for by such stalwarts as Generals Eisenhower and Bradly are now statutory reality. The road has been rocky and modern attempts at joint operations, prior to the Gulf War, have not always met expectations, as evidenced by our experience in Vietnam and as witnessed by the more recent ill-fated rescue attempt in Iran and the serious coordination problems in Greneda.

In conclusion, the Goldwater-Nichols act is a positive piece of legislation that further defines command and control within the military and ensures that, in the words of Secretary Aspin, quoting General Eisenhower, we have created a military structure "singly led and prepared to fight as one regardless of service." The remaining task is to insure that "interoperability" as a concept is implemented at all levels within the unified commands and that the "joint career" path is given the attention, support, and career emphasis that the statute mandates.

Note 1: During the Gulf War I was Staff Judge Advocate of an ARCENT major subordinate command, the 416th Engineer Command. I had occasion to coordinate directly with CENTCOM on selected matters. From my limited perspective, I agree that "interoperability" worked flawlessly and is to be praised. This is particularly true in terms of contrasting my Gulf experience with my experience as a company grade combat officer in Vietnam. Nevertheless, I still observed an unacceptable level of petty bickering and jealousy among the services at much lower levels of command.


Full Military Biography
Other military essays by Col Osgood
Pagecode=w16.htm

Also see www.juris99.com/index.htm