A Joint Strategic/Operational Approach to Meeting the National Security Challenges of the Late 1990's and Beyond.

by

Colonel John Osgood, Retired (c) 1994

This paper will discuss common threads that exist within the proposed doctrinal concepts of the Army, Air Force and Navy that will promote a joint strategic/operational approach to meeting the national security challenges of the late 1990's and beyond.

The fundamental elements of national defense strategy, as envisioned by the National Command Authority and embraced by each of the respective services, are; strategic deterrence of nuclear attack; the maintenance of a forward presence abroad; the ability to engage in crisis response through power projection to deter conflict and the ability to respond with overwhelming combat power to defeat that enemy who is not deterred by power projection; and a sound reconstitution policy that will ensure our ability to maintain our technical, doctrinal, and training edge and the ability to mobilize effectively and infuse additional personnel when needed. This requires strong emphasis on readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, technological superiority and employment of decisive force. In terms of planning and employment, this means deterring and when necessary fighting regional as opposed to global wars in defined theaters of operation by unified commands. It demands continued strong adherence to concepts within our own military structure of jointness and interoperability among the services as well as the ability to work effectively and efficiently in a coalition environment. This requires adaptive and creative decentralized planning by the combatant commanders (CINCs) of the unified commands as they carry out SECDEF guidance and mission assignments around the globe with the realization that future operations will be joint and likely a coalition effort.

The base force, consisting of active and reserve elements, is a total force package consisting of strategic, Pacific, Atlantic, and contingency forces that employ unified combatant commands under the command of a CINC. Joint Pub 1 clearly states that the operational concept envisions synchronization of air, land, sea, space and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives.

Strategic forces will continue to be based on a triad consisting of a manned bomber leg, ballistic missile submarines and land-based ICMBs. The SDI program has been modified and now is based on a strategy of global protection against limited strikes (GPALS). The Navy and Air Force will continue to assume major responsibility for strategic defense.

In addition to its triad role, the Navy, with Marine Corps assistance, will continue to focus on sea control, forward presence, and power projection. The "sea-air-land" team constitutes an expeditionary force that has the ability to engage in a full spectrum of operations with the advantage of projecting power from offshore and rapidly engaging when necessary. The Navy will concentrate on the littoral warfare area with less emphasis on control of the high seas. The Navy and Marine Corps will be particularly useful in providing security during the lodgment phase while the Army and Air Force deploy decisive combat forces to a ground theater. Indeed, Army doctrine recognizes that Marines provide relatively heavy forces that can be used to execute forcible entry over the beach and can reinforce early deployed airborne and other light Army forces. At sea, in the littoral sea lanes, the Navy will protect sea lines of communication and provide air security and close air support.

By doctrine, all three services are prepared to conduct operations across the operational continuum ranging from peace keeping and humanitarian operations and low intensity conflicts to full scale warfare such as occurred in Desert Storm. Major theater land campaigns will emphasize AirLand operations and will involve operations against an enemy in depth, although such operations will in many cases be nonlinear and dynamic, placing additional demands on joint coordination and creating additional opportunities for employment of joint forces in a variety of settings, as specified in the theater plan.

The typical theater campaign plan segregates AirLand Operations into three major divisions: the forward area known as the "joint intelligence and air attack area"; the joint battle area; and the joint staging and dispersal area. All the services will, by doctrine, have some degree of responsibility for activities within each area; however, Army AirLand doctrine envisions most of the activity in the forward area and the joint battle area as being primarily an Army and Air Force effort.

According to Air Force Manual 1-1, the Air force performs four basic roles in the theater: aerospace control, force application, force enhancement, and force support. Aerospace assets are used to provide intelligence information for all three services. TRADOC Pam 525-5 says "the major focus of air operations is establishing early local air superiority over the battlefield and staging operations while providing interdiction." In the forward area, the Air Force gathers intelligence, strikes strategic targets, conducts offensive counterair interdiction and engages in special operations when required. The Army's role in the forward area is more restricted and normally confined to special operations and intelligence gathering.

Within the joint battle area, air and ground forces concentrate major combat power, engage in fire and maneuver, fire support, special operations, close air support, and defensive counterair interdiction. This is normally the enemy's operational center of gravity where the "decisive operations" that will bring about the total and violent destruction of his forces will occur. Inside the staging area, air, ground and sea forces perform security missions but are concerned primarily with logistical, basing, airlift and deployment concerns.

As the military establishment reduces in size and continues with its transition from forward defense to forward presence (power projection), it becomes increasingly important for all the services to agree on common doctrine to successfully operate across the continuum of military operations.


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