Update Note: This article is over seven years old and does not take into consideration defense spending and reallocations during President Clinton's second term and the current War on Terrorism being conducted by the Bush administration.
This article will examine the evolution of United States nuclear strategy beginning with the Truman administration and conclude with a discussion of current nuclear policies and doctrine, including a discussion of the controversial "Strategic Defense Initiative." It will analyze some of Colonel Arthur Lykke, Jr.'s, theoretical concepts of strategy, focusing on his "ends-ways-means" model, and examine how such strategic analysis is applicable in the realm of possible employment of nuclear weapons.
By doctrine (JCS Pub. 1), military strategy is ". . . the art and science of employing the armed forces . . . to secure the objectives of national policy by application of force, or the threat of force. Note 1. While this definition makes sense in a conventional setting, there is considerable debate as to whether there is such a thing as a realistic and rational "nuclear strategy." Note 2. The weight of authority suggests there is.
Colonel Lykke equates military strategy to a three legged stool which supports national security, and says: "[It] consists of the establishment of military objectives [ends], the formulation of military strategic concepts [ways] to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military resources [means] to implement the concepts." The Colonel observes that if the elements do not compliment each other, our national security may suffer.
Obviously, formulating a workable military strategy envisions the use and employment of the full range of military options available to the strategic planner, including nuclear devices and delivery platforms and systems. One of the difficulties inherent in attempting to formulate a plausible "nuclear strategy" is trying to determine how best to employ these resources (existing and planned) as an adjunct to national grand strategy and in the more limited context of military strategy.
At some risk of oversimplification, it is safe to say that U.S. policy (Lykke's objective or ends) over the past four decades vis a vis the Soviets has included a desire to stem the tide of attempted worldwide Soviet expansionism, insure the continued security of Europe through a strong NATO, and prevent global nuclear war (emphasis on defense) through deterrence or other means. This policy has always recognized the possibility that such confrontation could lead to the strategic (global exchange by ICBM's, manned bombers and submarines -- the TRIAD) or tactical (lower yield battlefield exchange) employment of such weapons. Note 3.
Two basic theories of targeting, counterpower and countervalue (assured destruction), each with its own nuances, have evolved over the years and enjoyed varied popularity with the politicians and strategists. Note 4. Initially, in the post world War II era, the Truman administration viewed the atomic bomb as a weapon to be used against Soviet cities as a strategic weapon to accomplish what the fire bombing of Germany and nuclear attacks on Japan did. In reality this was the genesis of countervalue targeting. Note 5.
The development of the bomb in Soviet Russia in 1949, followed a few years later by drastic improvements in delivery systems on both sides (fueled in the U.S. by the Sputnik embarrassment), caused the Eisenhower administration privately to shift to counterforce targeting, while publicly endorsing massive retaliation, according to Mazarr. Obviously, countervalue and mutually assured destruction (MAD) are terms and concepts that imply that no side can clearly win and proponents thus argued it was the best form of deterrence against war since war was "madness." Conversely, counterforce was and still is seen as provocative and likely to increase the chances that one side will engage in a "first strike" at some point during a serious political crises.
The Kennedy administration emphasized a flexible response which supposedly provided more options. Again, public pressure on both Kennedy and his successor, Johnson, forced administration officials to revert to a publicly endorsed policy of assured destruction, although counterforce doctrine was not fully abandoned.
Richard Nixon and his advisors openly endorsed counterforce doctrine, encouraged the development of improved delivery systems (the MIRV), and promoted an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system (forerunner of "star-wars" and the Patriot system). Not surprisingly, given his Navy background, President Carter, too, believed that it was possible to strategically defeat the Soviets with the TRIAD by destroying their command and control centers and their means of waging war, and by killing their leaders -- pure counterforce. Supporters pointed to the fact that the Soviets clearly believed that one side could prevail in a nuclear war and the best way to insure a stalemate was to insure the Soviets were convinced that they would suffer massive defeat in a war with the Western block.
The Reagan and Bush administrations continued to openly endorse counterforce doctrine with heavy emphasis on the need for strategic defense. Counterforce is most effective when there is a clear ability to locate and destroy enemy mobile weapons platforms and command centers. As treaties and negotiations such as SALT I and II and START reduce delivery capability and the number of actual warheads, the ability to win quickly and decisively by counterforce strategy diminishes proportionally. Conversely, the ability to mount an effective second strike and engage in a more protracted war increases. The SDI advocates argue that an effective ABM system is absolutely necessary in the face of such cutbacks, reductions, and target realignments, with increased risk factor.
The popular perception of SDI was a "star wars" beam weapons system that vaporizes enemy missiles as they attempt to enter U.S. atmosphere. This was, in reality, only a small part of the overall program. With the collapse of Soviet Russia, the current administration has settled on a less ambitious program now referred to as GPALS which is an acronym for "global protection against limited strikes." GPALS, as described by Peter Clausen in Star Warriors Try Again, was intended to rely on ground-based interceptors (upscaled Patriots among others) on U.S. territory in conjunction with the so-called "brilliant eyes/pebbles" projects. Even today, critics continue to brand SDI as a fraud and argue that it merely contributes to yet further escalations in the arms race.
With the demise of the "evil empire" and unilateral arms reduction by the Soviets, many in Congress continue to argue that it is time for even more drastic defense spending cuts. Ironically, with the fragmentation of the Soviet empire and the entry of more third world countries into the nuclear family, it may be more important today, than ever before, to have a strong SDI program of some type regardless of what you call it. Moreover, concepts, as unpopular as they might seem in terms of expense, such as the MX rail and the Stealth and B2 bombers take on added importance as we shift to reliance on a smaller force that will continue to utilize counterforce or some variant of it as our primary strategy. Belief in the liberal utopia of a new order free from conflict is unrealistic and dangerous thinking.
Note 2 Admiral Eccles argues that nuclear weapons have no "useful political purpose" and therefore the term "nuclear strategy" is invalid. Strategy -- Theory and Application, p. 39. He views "nuclear deterrence" as a negative aspect of grand strategy. Interestingly, no specific definition of the term "nuclear strategy" appears in the "Glossary of Military Terms" of Lykke's Military Strategy.
Note 3. Prior to the collapse of the old Soviet empire, the sheer strength of the Warsaw Pact virtually insured that NATO forces would engage in "first use" of tactical low yield weapons rather that suffer massive defeat. This, of course, raised many questions as to whether such use would lead to immediate escalation and a global exchange.
Note 4. Mazarr says that the current policy is counterforce but argues that it is time for a new doctrine, "counterpower", which would be a modification of the two, with emphasis on "assured destruction", which would also target enemy nuclear and non-nuclear military targets. He sees it as a means to control escalation of the arms race i.e. elimination of B-2 bomber project. Mazarr, Michael J., Beyond Counterforce.
Note 5. Clausewitz would not disapprove; however, this kind of targeting philosophy does raise complicated moral and legal issues as pointed out by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his speech, The Strategic Implications of "Thou Shalt Not Kill." Citing the American Catholic Bishops' argument in their pastoral letter that a just war should include principles of discrimination, proportionality and probability of success, he makes a persuasive argument for SDI.
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