This is an index with a brief summary from which you can link to articles written by Colonel John Osgood, Retired. Colonel Osgood is a Vietnam veteran with combat command experience who also served as a member of the General Staff of the 416th Engineer Command in the Persian Gulf. He is a graduate of the Army War College and retired with more than 31 years of total active and reserve service. He is a criminal defense attorney in the Kansas City, Missouri metro area.
Full Military Biography

NOTICE: These are papers written by the author based on his own research and interest in the subjects indicated. Nothing contained in any of these articles, papers, or essays should be construed as stating official United States policy or Department of the Army policy on any issue. These represent the author's personal views and opinions on the issues and these are not official Department of the Army documents. They are presented to simply stimulate intellectual interest and debate on the issues.

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United States Nuclear Strategy 1945-1995 - W14

Evolution of United States nuclear strategy beginning with the Truman administration and concluding with a discussion of current nuclear policies and doctrine, including a discussion of the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative.

Goldwater Nichols Act - Managing the Department of Defense - W16

Discuss the major provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols act and explores how these provisions have improved and enhanced the management and administration of the United States Department of Defense.

Strategic Vision for the U.S. Armed Forces in the Year 2020 - wc9

Paper discusses strategic visions for the U.S. Armed Forces in the year 2020. Attempts to project military requirements into the next century and what strategy the US should pursue.

The First Persian Gulf War - Was it Legal and Moral? - w15

Examines the U.S. policy and strategy as developed and applied in the Persian Gulf War and its application to the doctrine espoused by former Secretary Weinberger in 1985, vis a vis doctrine intended to provide guidance for application of force in settings ranging from full scale nuclear war to limited involvement in potentially low intensity conflicts

The Three Major Strategic Considerations That Shaped
"Europe First Strategy" During World War II - wc11

This historical article looks at the three major strategic considerations that shaped "Europe first strategy" during World War II; coalition warfare, technology, and resources; how the strategy actually was implemented; and, how such strategy might be viewed in the context of theoretical doctrine as espoused by Clausewitz and other authorities. It covers the period prior to the U.S. entry into the war and discuss events leading to the execution of Operation Overlord.

The Four Categories of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) - wc8

Article describes the four categories of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), examines one in detail, and concludes with discussion of unique roles, missions, and capabilities that special operations forces (SOF) would contribute to the CINC's campaign plan execution in a hypothetical Libya campaign.

Possible Nature of the Next "Small War" or "Low Intensity
Conflict" (LIC) in Which the United States Is Likely to Become Embroiled - wc3

This paper will explore the possible nature of the next "small war" or "Low Intensity Conflict" (LIC) in which the United States is likely to become embroiled, whether such a conflict is likely to be a multi-force operation, and how such a conflict might impact on the United States, its people, and, the military forces that will be called upon to conduct it.  Note:  In light of the current state of world affairs this article is more timely than perhaps I could have ever guessed.

Joint Strategic/Operational Approach to
Meeting the National Security Challenges of the Late 1990's and Beyond - wc7

A discussion of common threads that exist within the proposed doctrinal concepts of the Army

Operation Overlord - The D-day Invasion at Normandy - wc5

This historical article looks at Operation OVERLORD in terms of the strategic and operational setting; examines campaign maneuvers, operational fires, and logistics; and concludes with a discussion of lines of operation as it applied in that situation.

Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D.
Eisenhower. -- Contrasts in Leadership - wc2

This article discusses the strategic leadership strengths and weaknesses of Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower. The primary source for biographical information was Commander in Chief by Eric Larrabee. For contrast I relied on William Manchester's biography of MacArthur, American Caesar, and Eisenhower at War 1943-1945 by David Eisenhower.

Organizational and Command and Control Challenges for the Combat
Commander (Cinc) in Command Of Joint and Combined Forces in Mature and Contingency Theaters - wc6

Title is self-explanatory

Clausewitz's Concept of the Military Center of Gravity - wc4

Article defines "center of gravity" and the relationship between it and vulnerabilities. It also explains the distinction between the strategic and operational level of center of gravity.

Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini and Military Strategy - w12

Paper compares and contrasts the strategic writings of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini, 19th Century military strategists. Discusses geo-political forces and individual experiences instrumental in shaping each theorist's hypothesis about war.

Grant's Operational Strategy at Vicksburg - w13

Paper discusses the operational strategy employed by General Grant during his campaign in the West and focuses on his capture of Vicksburg in July, 1863.

Are There Two Major Competing Forces in the International Environment, "Integration" and "Fragmentation?" - wc1

John Lewis Gaddis hypothesizes that the end of the Cold War and the demise of clear geopolitical division and confrontation between East and West has resulted in the emergence of a contest between two major competing forces in the international environment, "integration" and "fragmentation." He argues that our "involvement" in the post-cold war global arena i.e., the grand strategy we should pursue, should depend largely on which of these forces emerges as dominant.