This paper will examine the U.S. policy and strategy as developed and applied in the Persian Gulf War and its application to the doctrine espoused by former Secretary Weinberger in 1985, bearing in mind the doctrine was intended to provide guidance for application of force in settings ranging from full scale nuclear war to limited involvement in potentially low intensity conflicts such as Somalia. Weinberger contends that "as a major power, our responsibilities and interests are now of such a scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford to ignore."
As to the actual criteria, the first states that "we should engage our troops only if we must do so as a matter of our own vital national interest." According to the Secretary, "we cannot assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend their territory -- without their strong invitation -- when our own freedom is not threatened." Dubois says our involvement in the Gulf was justified because of a "wide variety of compelling national interests," such as the need for stability for the region (balance of power), economic concerns (oil), the fact that the invasion was a violation of international law, and both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia sought our assistance. Note 1. Also, it was an opportunity for the U.S. to rectify questionable State Department policy which conveyed the impression that the U.S. considered the Iraq/Kuwait "border dispute" a local Arab matter. Given the solidarity demonstrated by the U.N., our own inept pre-war diplomatic signals to Saddam, our position as the dominant world power, and the concern of the free world about the oil supply question, it would have been disastrous not to intervene. Note 2.
The second test states that we should commit forces "wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning." Weinberger clarifies this comment by defining winning as achieving our objectives. Note 3 Closely related, the third postulates that "[i]f we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives." We failed to achieve our political objectives in Vietnam because, as Summers points out, our objectives were not clearly stated and we did not possess the national will to win. Conversely, President Bush made it clear from the start that our objectives in the Gulf were to remove Saddam's forces from Kuwait and restore the lawful government. These same "objectives" were adopted by the U.N. and accomplished with overwhelming success. Note 4. If the strategy is open to criticism, it must be that we failed to articulate in the beginning an ambitious enough goal i.e., the destruction of Iraq's military machine and the removal of Saddam from power. On the other hand, such a policy would have likely spelled the demise of the delicate coalition and widespread Arab support for our actions. President Bush was decidedly correct in his policies and we will reap the benefits in future Arab relations.
Point four states that the relationship between the objectives and the forces committed must be continually reassessed and, if necessary, readjusted, because "[c]onditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict." If Bush is to be faulted in his Gulf policy, it must be for not anticipating the early success and formulating an acceptable strategy to take advantage of the developing and changing situation. Note 5
Point five declares that prior to committing forces, there must be "some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representative in Congress." Weinberger says the key to obtaining such support is candidness in "making clear the threats we face." Ironically, the vote in Congress in favor of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was almost unanimous, whereas the vote in the Senate on the Persian Gulf involvement passed by a mere two votes. Note 6 Unfortunately, the Johnson administration squandered and mismanaged its congressional support as well as early popular support because of an inability to articulate a real winning strategy. Conversely, in the Gulf crises objectives remained focused and clear and, with the massive involvement of reserve forces, the war effort received a groundswell of support at home which clearly demonstrated that the "national will" was behind the President.
Point six says "[t]he commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort." This is not isolationist or pacifist language, for Weinberger observes that early strong reaction to a situation may prevent the necessity for later "lion-like" responses. Certainly mindful of the Vietnam misadventure, he cautions against a "gradualist incremental approach" which would draw us into an "endless morass."
Obviously, none of the criteria should be viewed in an isolated context, for as Clausewitz teaches, war is the ultimate tool of diplomacy where force is used to achieve an objective when other means fail. Clearly, in the Gulf crises, as Dubois points out, "by operating under the aegis of the United Nations diplomatically, financially, and in many cases militarily, the Administration clearly signaled our desire to achieve our objectives short of combat." Dubois is correct when he describes our policy as "most patient." Saddam was given every opportunity to avert hostilities. Coalition force was indeed used as a last resort.
In summary, the use of force in the Gulf War was necessary, morally justified, and legal under international law. The actions taken were proportional to the threat and designed to accomplish the stated and limited objective of removing a hostile invading force from a sovereign territory. The Bush Administration's approach to the situation was a logical and justified response which clearly reflects the sound policy considerations espoused by Secretary Weinberger.
Note 2. The question of "oil" and other moral issues of our intervention are stimulating, as pointed out by Van Creveld in The Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 and the Future of Morally constrained War.
Note 3. Experts generally agree that two of many critical mistakes of Vietnam were piecemeal escalation and the ultimate failure to mobilize US reserve forces and force the South Vietnamese government to enter a total war posture e.g., Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context
Note 4. There is still considerable debate as to the wisdom of halting the advance when we did. The critics argue we failed to "win" when victory was in our immediate grasp. Dubois makes a case that early success in the air campaign and reports of war crimes and atrocities gave rise to "expanded expectations and more ambitious objectives." Obviously the debate will intensify with the renewed surgical strikes against Iraq (13 and 17 January 1993) and suggestions in the media that the war was fought in vein .e.g., recent syndicated column by Virginia Hall, Parting Shot at Saddam Hussein, Jan 14, 1992 (critical of entire Gulf episode and suggests that the Administration has lied about everything from troop levels to effectiveness of the Patriots.)
Note 5. In fairness to the planners, it is doubtful that any contingency plan which openly advocated the follow- on capture of Saddam and total destruction of his forces, after the liberation of Kuwait, would have received U.N. or Arab coalition approval. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, the current U.N. backed sanctions against Iraq (including recent air strikes) are an expansion of our original "objectives" and are examples of force commitment in response to changing situations.
Note 6, The controversial War Powers Act with its reporting requirements and potential to prevent the continued use of troops absent Congressional authority is not addressed directly by the Weinberger Doctrine. What does the Executive do when the "national will" suggests one course of action and Congress another?