This review will focus on John Lewis Gaddis's essay, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," and compare and contrast his main thesis with those of some of other experts. The article was written in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and during the Persian Gulf crisis. Gaddis hypothesizes that the end of the Cold War and the demise of clear geopolitical division and confrontation between East and West has resulted in the emergence of a contest between two major competing forces in the international environment, "integration" and "fragmentation." He argues that our "involvement" in the post-cold war global arena i.e., the grand strategy we should pursue, should depend largely on which of these forces emerges as dominant. According to Gaddis, integration is "the act of bringing things together to constitute something that is whole," .e.g. a "new world order," while fragmentation is the opposite extreme. Integration is promoted by such things as the world wide communication revolution, free trade, and an open economic system. It usually means a collective approach to security matters, encourages respect for human rights and promotes growth of democracy, and peace.
Fragmentation is characterized by a resurgence of nationalism and isolationism, or in its most extreme and dangerous form, what John Mearsheimer terms "hypernationalism," the belief by nationalists that competing states and their citizens are inferior (ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and a resurgence of neo-nazism in Germany). In the economic sphere, fragmentation produces trade barriers and favors economic protectionism. Gaddis says fragmentation also promotes racial tension, religious fundamentalism, and is often manifested in a "simple drive for power" (all of which contributed to the Gulf crises). He contends that these same forces are in direct competition within American society itself and have a direct impact on national policy, on both the domestic and international fronts.
Gaddis believes that these two forces rather than traditional ideological rivalries will have the greatest impact on security interests of the United States in the post Cold War period. He concludes that integration is the more "benign" of the two, was responsible for bringing the Cold War to an end, and will prevail. Compare this with Alan Tonelson's "What is the National Interest?" Tonelson argues that our foreign policy has been internationalism for over half a century and says that the focus of post Cold War policy should be on what he terms "interest based thinking." Tonelson says this is not isolationism but merely healthy skepticism of prior policy where the only rule of thumb would be "whatever works," a seeming endorsement of fragmentation.
Gaddis's thesis is neither novel nor new. William Hyland, in his article, "America's New Course," quoting Hans Morgenthau, says there has always been a tendency of American policy to swing back and forth between the extremes of isolationism and "indiscriminate internationalism or globalism." Robert Art ("A Defensible Defense") says policy shifts along a "continuum" from "unbridled" internationalism to "constricted" isolationism. Unfortunately, Gaddis seems more intent on defining terms and framing issues than offering a clear strategy to follow in the post Cold War environment. For example, unlike most scholars, he does not seem to draw much distinction between the economic, political and military elements of grand strategy, or what Bartlett and Holman refer to as the "strategic tripod."
Both Hyland and Theodore Sorensen (Rethinking National Security) develop Gaddis's thesis more thoroughly and, more importantly, offer viable alternatives now that the policy of "containment" of Soviet military and ideological power is no longer viable. Robert Art takes the process even further and recommends a specific strategy to pursue, something that is missing in Gaddis's essay and undercuts its effectiveness.
Walter Lippmann is credited with the idea that when a nation's commitments exceed its power "insolvency" results which causes what Huntington terms "deep political dissension." Gaddis weaves this idea into his essay when he suggests that our commitment to integration may not come cheaply and may not be as "deeply rooted" as we like to think it is. He questions whether Americans really want to integrate the US economy into the world market and notes that American's have always been reluctant " . . . to bring the costs of providing for its security into line with what it is willing to pay," suggesting a serious imbalance in applying an "ends, ways, and means" test. Unfortunately, he does not develop this idea well and leaves the impression that our policy has been one of insolvency and that we should perhaps look to a strategy of ". . . less grandiose visions, but more sustainable policies," a point which he fails to support by argument or with examples.
Hyland notes that there are two theories to explain why the Soviet Union collapsed. One theory says communism surrendered to the demands of human rights and freedom was a natural byproduct. The other credits the allied determination to stand up more firmly than ever to Soviet aggression and ideology. One can only conclude that Gaddis subscribes the to former and, although he does not say so, believes that America's global military strategy should be one of retrenchment. He sees the Gulf War experience as a positive indication that the conduct of international relations can be conducted within the more idealist framework of international law and says it is strong evidence to counter the argument that the US is the only nation with the " . . . will and capacity to take the lead in policing (or nannying) the world."
Gaddis's essay is a worthwhile piece of work to the extent that it causes one to ponder the direction that global relations will take in the Cold War vacuum. Comparatively speaking though, Art's essay ("Defensible Defense") accomplishes the same thing by recognizing the competing forces but then devotes most of the text to the identification of strategic issues (ends) and offers clearly defined courses of action (ways) to achieve our objectives without succumbing to "insolvency" i.e. ensuring that Colonel Lykke's three legged stool remains balanced.
In summary, Gaddis's essay is of little value if one is attempting to rely on it as primary source material to use in formulating a meaningful grand strategy for the nineties and beyond. It is useful as supplemental material to the extent that it brings the two forces into clearer focus.