This paper will analyze the three major strategic considerations that shaped "Europe first strategy" during World War II; coalition warfare, technology, and resources; how the strategy actually was implemented; and, how such strategy might be viewed in the context of theoretical doctrine as espoused by Clausewitz and other authorities. The analysis will cover the period prior to the U.S. entry into the war and discuss events leading to the execution of Overlord.
The post "Great War" period in the U.S. saw a resurgence in popularity of isolationist policies. On the heels of this, the country experienced an unprecedented economic decline resulting in the great depression. The decade of the "thirties" saw the rise of National Socialism and the Nazi Party in Germany. Praying on economic woes, racial hatred, and distorted views of nationalism, Hitler quickly solidified his power and commenced his conquest of Europe. On September 1, 1939, as a result of the invasion of Poland, Britain went to war with the Axis Powers.
Although professing isolationist policies and declaring itself neutral, the U.S. clearly aligned itself early with the British and entered a period of war preparation, both militarily (first peacetime draft) and industrially (naval construction, etc.).Note 1. After Germany's repudiation of its non- aggression pact with Soviet Russia and the resultant invasion, it became apparent to strategic planners that the defeat of Germany would require a "Grand Alliance" between the three major powers, Russia, the U.S. and Great Britain. Thus, the U.S. openly chose sides through Lend-lease (1941) and other programs designed to clearly support the allies in the war effort.
The subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into the war in December, 1941, were the culminating events which required the big three powers to face the issues of developing clear strategies and operational time tables for the defeat of the axis forces. All agreed at the Arcadia conference that the strategic war end to be achieved was the unconditional defeat of Germany and Japan by the most expeditious way. Note 2. Reasons and underlying political strategies differed; however, according to Doctor Matloff. Britain wanted to restore its empire status quo. For the Soviets, the defeat of Germany was "merely a pause in twin drives for security and expansion." The U.S. motives were, to some extent, altruistic owning to what Matloff describes as "strong bonds of culture, language and tradition with western Europe." Arcadia resulted in a reaffirmation of the earlier strategy of "Europe First" which had been accepted by the U.S. and British at the 1941 American-British Conversations (ABC). Note 3.
Popular feelings ran high in the U.S. that Japan should feel the early and immediate brunt of the U.S. war effort. "Europe First" recognized; however, that war in the Pacific should be one of defensive containment with the main thrust elsewhere. Note 4. Britain was the logical geographic location to mass forces for an invasion of Europe. The Soviets were exerting renewed pressure on the Eastern front and the U.S. needed time to rebuild its naval striking power. The "lines of communication" between the British Isles and the United States were efficient and relatively easy to protect. The result was a decision to strike the axis powers at their "center of gravity" or what Clausewitz described as "the most effective target for a blow," the German heartland. After Germany's demise the alliance would then be free to deal with Japan.
"Europe First" as a concept was wanting in terms of operational strategic planning. The American JCS and Marshall favored a direct cross-channel invasion in 1943 (Bolero- Roundup). U.S. planners, according to Matloff, believed in a "war of mass and concentration -- of a decisive war leading to the defeat of the enemies' armies." Matloff says it was a reflection of the "American optimism and confidence" in its means to win, that is, its ability to field a large citizen army and industrially outproduce the enemy in terms of weapons, munitions, planes and other war related goods. The Soviets, hard pressed on the Eastern front, were single minded. They wanted a second front in France to relieve pressure in their theater. Great Britain, with its limited ground combat means, bad experience at Dunkirk, and history as a naval power, favored blockade, bombing, and "underbelly" peripheral attacks in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Both the U.S. and Great Britain justified their plans as relieving pressure on the Eastern front.
Ultimately, Roosevelt overrule his JCS, shelved Bolero- Roundup, and yielded to Torch (invasion of North Africa). This pacified the British, gave the U.S. time to build its forces in Great Britain, put U.S. ground troops into actual combat at an earlier point (deemed politically advisable) and put the U.S. in a better position to argue for the cross-channel strategy when the time came to enter the European continent. While Marshall and Secretary Stimson saw Torch as "periphery pecking," modern historians suggest that Roundup was over ambitious and that such an invasion, while successful initially, may have reached what Clausewitz terms a "culminating point" (over extension) before victory was achieved, with results being potentially disastrous.
The Casablanca conference, while disappointing to the JCS, and while not firmly deciding the cross-channel question, did establish the course of the war in the Mediterranean and, more importantly, "marked a strategic milestone in assigning air power a definite place in Allied planning against Germany." The May, 1943, Trident conference was another compromise. The U.S. obtained a concession that the final thrust would be a cross-channel invasion but stopped resisting Mediterranean operations per se. Note 5. Trident also marked the beginning of a realization by the allies of the importance of long range planning.
The subsequent successful invasion of Sicily, followed by the invasion of Italy, further secured Allied lines of communications in the region, diverted German resources from the Eastern front, and caused the Germans to continue to speculate as to whether the assault on Europe would be cross-channel or "underbelly." Note 6. This course of action also allowed the combined bomber offensive against Germany more time and resources to achieve its objectives on the continent.
By January, 1944, the cross-channel strategy was "fixed." Overlord would be the greatest amphibious operation in history. This marked a period of intense operational planning. Eisenhower was immediately confronted with the old problem of diversion of resources (Italy was at a stalemate) and whether to commit fully to Anvil. Landing craft availability was again a crucial issue and was further complicated when the JCS approved Shingle, the Anzio invasion. Nevertheless, after Eisenhower's assumption of command the "die was cast" and Overlord became a reality. In actuality, the Western Alliance had decided to follow through with Overlord and make it the main effort in Europe only when it made military sense. By the summer of 1944 it did.
Greenfield concludes his article in the student workbook by observing that one of the most striking features of Anglo- American strategy was that "military considerations consistently prevailed." He attributes this to the fact that it was probably the only way that a coalition "with disparate political interests could be held together" to achieve final victory. Note 7.
In summary, the "Europe first strategy" allowed the coalition forces to concentrate on defeating the axis powers by using the bulk of available means (about 70% to 30%) against Germany (and Italy) while fighting a war of containment in the Pacific, with the ultimate end to then entail a "Grand Alliance" assault on the Japanese home islands. Fortunately, American war production exceeded all expectations, as did battle successes in the step-child war in the Pacific. This, in conjunction with the technological development of the atomic bomb and its employment against Japan, probably prevented the creation of a divided Japan and a world much different from what we know today.
Footnotes:
2. The term "unconditional surrender" was introduced by Roosevelt at the Casablanca conference in January, 1943. Greenfield in American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration, does not see this as significant. He says it was already "understood" by the allies as necessity.
3. Arcadia also marked the birth of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), the coalition war staff, and its U.S. counterpart, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Thus, coalition warfare entered a new phase and dimension.
4. The early unexpected successes at Midway and Corral Sea did not alter the "Europe First" strategy; however, the ability to assume a more aggressive role in the Pacific did provide the U.S. with more bargaining power during strategy sessions on how to fight the war in Europe.
5. Matloff notes that a key issue and one that directly affected European strategy was production and availability of landing craft. The JCS was concerned that diversion of these vital invasion resources to the Mediterranean would further hamper and delay a cross-channel attack.
6. The attacks on Ploesti probably also added to the German confusion as to allied strategy.
7. This is Jomini's idea of how war should be conducted. In retrospect, having observed what happened to Europe for 40 years following the defeat of Germany, perhaps a Clausewitzian approach with more considerations to the political outcome would have been advisable.