This paper will explore the possible nature of the next "small war" or "Low Intensity Conflict" (LIC) in which the United States is likely to become embroiled, whether such a conflict is likely to be a multi-force operation, and how such a conflict might impact on the United States, its people, and, the military forces that will be called upon to conduct it. Note 1. The paper will conclude with a short analysis of a current situation which might ultimately call for military intervention.

Any analysis of LIC inevitably dwells at length on the Viet Nam debacle and usually warns against any repeat of a similar misadventure, suggesting such wars cannot be won. Note 2. Harry Summers in his definitive work, On Strategy, argues persuasively that ". . . our failure in Vietnam grew out of a lack of appreciation of military theory and military strategy and especially the relationship between military strategy and national policy," i.e., Clausewitz's trinity. In other words, we did not understand our enemy, lacked clear strategic direction, and failed to strike him at his "center of gravity." Note 3.

Post Viet Nam successes in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf have probably convinced many experts that involvement in a protracted guerilla war is unsound policy and contrary to our national interest, because such a war cannot be won without paying a high cost our nation is unwilling to pay. Alternatively, experts will be quick to point out that the key to success in a "small war" is massive concentration of air/land forces in the theater of operation, with violent conventional multi-national attacks directed against enemy combat forces and lines of communication. These will be small but conventional wars which will probably involve coalition forces comprised of states that have a regional political (military security) interest in the outcome. In other words, the lessons learned from Desert Storm and, to a lesser extent, the Korean war, will become the models to follow. Proponents will argue that such wars will have a high probability of success, will be viewed as a legitimate extension of diplomacy if regional coalition forces are involved, and will have world popular support, particularly if a United Nations mandate is in effect.

In the U.S., the people element of the trinity (particularly those of middle age) who remember the turmoil and civil unrest surrounding the Viet Nam experience, will likely resist any attempts to bog the U.S. down in protracted operations in Africa or the Western Hemisphere. This element will likely reluctantly acknowledge that our military role should be confined to "Persian Gulf" scenarios, while feeling some solace from the fact that Europe is at peace. Note 4. The government element, as newly constituted in the post-election period, will resist military adventurism, will concentrate on reduction of military spending and will urge redistribution of defense dollar resources in favor of social programs. Finally, the administration will consider "new directions" for the army element which may include a wider role in border security, domestic law enforcement (requires statutory amendments), and anti-drug interdiction. Note 5. The active force will be smaller, more mobile (greater emphasis on rapid deployment and pre-positioning of war stocks) and, out of necessity, more dependant on the reserve force structure. As these changes occur, the army and government will face new strategic planning issues and must be prepared to respond to a variety of global situations, any number of which could evolve into full scale limited war. Indeed, the current situation in Liberia is illustrative of some of the dilemmas facing the U.S. as a world power with international responsibilities. Gadhafi is openly backing a radical regime and, according to one associated press report, is "attempting to exert influence on the entire region." Note 6. Liberia has strong U.S. ties, a constitution patterned after our own, and is a Christian and Muslim nation which was partly settled by freed American slaves. With Doe's assassination in 1990, things are in absolute chaos. Recently Archbishop Michael Francis said the U.S. has "a moral responsibility to help end the country's brutal, nearly 3-year old conflict." This may be one of many formidable challenges for the new Clinton administration.

Footnotes:

1. This is Clausewitz's "trinity." He contended that war was comprised of three dominant elements, violence, chance and policy, or, more simply, the people, the army, and government. See Clausewitz, On War, bk I, ch. I, p. 89.

2. Major Challis's article, Counterinsurgency Success in Malaya, cogently points out the fallacious nature of such thinking and demonstrates that a Viet Nam scenario can succeed and insurgents can be defeated.

3. As an interesting aside, Summers points out that General Dung used a classic pincer movement through the Central Highlands in conjunction with a conventional attack across the DMZ to bring the South to its knees, a tactic that would have worked in reverse for the U.S. On the other hand, Gates, VietNam: The Debate Goes On, takes a different view.

4. The popular view that peace has swept over Europe and Asia must be viewed with some skepticism. The chaos from the collapse of communism, economic problems, and long standing ethnic and religious differences in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Republics could easily result in regional conflict at any moment. It is not just the African and South and Central American states that continue to struggle with internal strife and external threat. This may be the new administration's greatest challenge and one for which it is, at best, ill equipped to handle.

5. Whether plans such as JTF 6 will ultimately lead to foreign intervention, with or without host nation support and agreement, i.e. surgical strikes against drug enclaves, remains to be seen.

6. Somalia has similar problems. The U.N. brokered cease-fire (Feb, 92) is tenuous at best. If it fails, the U.S. could easily assume a greater role in this part of Africa also.