This paper will discuss Organizational and Command and Control challenges for the combatant commander (CINC) in command of joint and combined forces in mature and contingency theaters.
Joint US operations in the AOR or theater fall under unified and specified commands, subordinate unified commands and joint task forces. Combined forces include the former and troops of a host nation (HN) or other participating UN or coalition forces. During initial planning, the CINC must decide how to employ his forces (air, land, sea, and special ops) efficiently, maximizing special expertise in each service. Success in joint and combined operations demands avoidance of service parochialism and blind adherence to outdated stereotypical concepts of whom by tradition should perform what mission and who has the "right" to command, accordingly. Also, planners must avoid the tendency to employ coalition forces in a minor or secondary role.
In major operations such as Desert Storm, the CINC will likely have service component commanders under his command who will be responsible for major roles and missions, e.g., ARCENT with its subordinate corps headquarters. Conversely, in a less mature theater, smaller functional commands may be preferred, with an army or marine officer being designated as a joint forces land commander (JFLCC). Operational considerations and geographical conditions may make functional commands more desirable. For more limited incursions, the CINC may wish to employ a joint task force (JTF), e.g., Grenada. Also, the CINC should carefully consider command relationships such as OPCON and TACON and how each affects his ability to accomplish the mission. The CINC must thoroughly understand logistics, timed phased deployment, resupply and administration and organize his theater to maximize support without penalizing combat power with the goal of preventing waste, duplication of effort and bickering among subordinate commands over vital resources.
Host nation and coalition force relationships must be of special concern. The CINC must understand that US vital interests may not always coincide with those of the host nation or coalition forces involved, that such nations may subscribe to military doctrine and training very different from ours, that their weapons systems and equipment may be inferior and incompatible with our own, and that cultural and language differences may present extraordinary problems of communication, command and control on the battle field.
The key to successful combined operations is unity of effort. Within the theater, coalition forces are apt to retain overall command of their own units, preferring to place such units under OPCON or TACON control of the CINC. The CINC may find that he is required to be commander, consensus builder and statesman. Many of these problems can be diminished by use of the combined staff or strong liaison officer relationships.
During the actual combat phase, the CINC must give special attention to employment of fires, intelligence gathering, and logistics to ensure that his combined force functions efficiently and major operational objectives are achieved on schedule in a coordinated environment with minimum disruption attributable to the inherent differences between coalition partners.
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