This article will describe the four categories of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), examine one in detail, and conclude with a discussion of the unique roles, missions, and capabilities that special operations forces (SOF) can contribute to a CINC's campaign plan execution in a hypothetical Libya campaign.
Field Manual (FM) 100-20 is a combined effort of the Army and Air Force to develop comprehensive military doctrine covering operations in the LIC environment. The FM says "support for insurgency and counter insurgency," involves situations in which the US assists an incumbent government with counterinsurgency or, conversely, promotes an existing insurgent movement through direct and indirect intervention.
An understanding of the dynamics of leadership, ideology, environment, geography, and external support are essential before engaging. Focus is on garnering maximum support of the population mass. "Combatting terrorism," involves direct steps to protect installations, units, and individuals from actual and threatened terrorism, which is the unlawful use of force and violence to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. The methods used vary, depending on whether the operation is one of antiterrorism (AT) or counterterrorism (CT) and at what point in the spectrum of the conflict the incident occurs. Actions involve both prophylactic and direct measures to defeat terrorism swiftly and violently in all environments under diverse situations.
A "peacekeeping Operation" is conducted with consent of the belligerent parties and is designed to maintain an existing diplomatically negotiated peace or cease fire. Such forces are usually not of sufficient size or strength to forcibly subdue the potential belligerent and any military action is confined to self-defense. "Peacetime contingency operations" are directed at crisis avoidance and crisis management situations to complement political policy. This often requires military intervention to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives. Such operations are characterized by "short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war" strongly influenced by METT-T factors.
FM 100-20 recognizes nine major types of peacetime contingency operations. Of the nine, I think shows of force and demonstration, strikes and raids, and peacemaking operations will be the most important to the US throughout this decade. Rescue and recovery operations become less of a problem if the US actively combats hostage taking through power projection and a demonstrated willingness to punish terrorists and the sponsor states rapidly. I believe the US will consciously avoid any offer to become ensnared in the quagmire situation that seems to be characteristic of unconventional warfare. I foresee that the military establishment will continue to exercise cautious and quiet resistance to a more active involvement in support to US civil authority, even in the face of arguments to increase the military's role in actual domestic law enforcement through modification of the Posse Comitatus Act. I do feel the military will continue to have a limited mission in combatting illegal drugs; however, I think the role will be limited to non- domestic situations and may ultimately take on more of the attributes of strikes and raids than support to US civil authority.
I feel, shows of force and demonstrations, will continue to be the most significant type of operation to the US. These involve forward deployment of US forces and high profile equipment, weapons platforms, ships and aircraft, often in conjunction with combined training exercises such as Bright Star (Egypt), Ochi Focus (South Korea) and others that directly further our national military strategy and serve as a strong deterrent to aggression by the third world. These activities, in conjunction with the strike and raid, and a committed willingness and national resolve to use the latter predictably (and judiciously) will continue to be a stabilizing influence and contribute to peace.
The strike or raid requires careful planning with a clear understanding of the strategic goal as well as the tactical objective. The CINC will usually rely on a joint task force to carry out such missions, relying heavily on the capabilities of special operations forces. Given the volatility and time sensitive nature of such operations, FM 100-20 suggests the use of a permanent planning cell to "build precise, well-conceived mission plans" to ensure flawless execution of such operations. Common targets consist of hostile key personnel and facilities (US raid on Libya), targets that have good psychological value, or are strategically significant, e.g., a nuclear weapons plant.
The more controversial operation, peacemaking, will take on added significance, particularly if the United Nations and other regional alliances continue to take an active and aggressive role in stabilizing world "hot spots." These, as demonstrated by events in Somalia, provide the greatest challenge for the CINC.
Special operations forces (SOF) now have an important role in the LIC environment. With the creation of the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), SOFs, comprised of special operations, psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) forces from all three services, now operate across the entire spectrum of conflict. SOF operations occur throughout the three major areas of the theater: the rear, the close battle area, and deep in the theater. SOFs would be particularly useful in a Libya campaign.
Army SOFs include the Special Forces teams, Rangers, aviation, counterterrorist forces, and other special mission units. Doctrine states that Army SFs, perform five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, and counterterrorism. With their deep strike capability, Army Rangers might be used in conjunction with other light forces to seize what appears to be a lightly defended air strip at Al Khofra, denying the enemy use of the key road between Tripoli and Khartoum. Prior to the actual raid, SF teams, and SOF intelligence assets would be used to provide an accurate assessment of the enemy threat (SR missions). The Air Force is equally committed to the SOF concept and recognizes, in General Eggers' words, "[the] concept of the operation is simply to get in, do our business and get out before we are discovered." AFSOC forces would be a key part of the theater operations, providing air security, intelligence, and airlift capability.
Navy SEALS would have a significant role in a Libya campaign. These forces can be used to neutralize harbors and enemy ships, clear mines, lay mines, prepare landing sites and gather intelligence about beach defenses. Securing a lightly defended deep water port might be a primary objective for coalition forces. Navy SEALS and other SOF units could be employed initially in support of a Marine or Army assault on the various objectives, clearing the way for an encirclement of enemy forces. PSYOP forces also would have a significant role in any such operation.
Finally, success of the campaign would envision a reinstitution of local government. Civil Affairs units will have a significant role in stabilizing major population centers and restoring order as these areas are liberated.
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