Author's Note: This was an attempt in 1994 to predict what course the Armed Forces should follow in the near future. It is interesting to compare these predictions from 1994 with the current state of world affairs in light of the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the subsequent War on Terrorism. An argument can probably be made that insufficient thought was given to issues of domestic terrorism. On the other hand, it appears that a considerable part of the essay has withstood the test of time.

This paper will discuss my strategic vision for the U.S. Armed Forces in the year 2020. It will take into consideration the national military strategy that we should pursue during the first two decades of the 21st century, discuss three of the most important long-range challenges facing the Army between now and the year 2020, and conclude with a discussion of the possible nature of conflict during the next quarter century and how the waging of such conflict has been impacted by recent technological advances in warfare.

The United States national military strategy for the next 25 years will continue have as its main objective the preservation and survival of the U.S. as a free and sovereign nation that is internally secure and economically viable and capable of competing in a global market, while simultaneously promoting global democratization, human rights and a stable and secure world. The fundamental elements of a national defense strategy designed to achieve these objectives will, of necessity, continue to support a policy of strategic deterrence of nuclear attack from whatever source (including space based weapons); the maintenance of a forward presence abroad and in space; the ability to engage in crisis response through power projection to deter conflict and the ability to respond with overwhelming combat power to defeat any enemy who is not deterred by power projection; and, a sound reconstitution policy that will ensure our ability to maintain our technical, doctrinal, and training edge and the ability to mobilize effectively and infuse additional personnel when needed (total force concept). Gray in his article, "Defense Planning for the Mystery Tour", calls pursuit of such a strategy "fault-tolerant planning" and says it will protect the United States in the most basic ways, will preserve our ability to wage war at long distance abroad, and assure our ability to conduct "large-scale regional military campaigns." Michael Klare ("Behind Desert Storm") describes the latter as the newly inaugurated paradigm for the U.S. military, and refers to it as the "mid-intensity conflict" (MIC). Klare says that the risk of such conflicts will persist for years and he supports Army assumptions that such conflicts will be "... based on ethnic, economic, religious, racial and nationalistic concepts as well as territorial ambitions" (quoting from USAR Long-Range Plan 1993-2023). >p> In implementing this strategy, the Army will be confronted with significant challenges as it is forced to downsize in response to reduced funding and the clamor by other special interest groups to divert even more of the defense budget to domestic programs (effect of the so-called peace dividend). A recent U.S. Space Command White Paper ("The Case for Space, July 1993") argues a somewhat one dimensional macro approach and says that it boils down simply to ensuring that we take maximum advantage of modern "force multipliers" i.e., sophisticated spaced based, weapons, communications, and reconnaissance platforms, designed to achieve these strategic objectives by virtue of technological superiority. Unquestionably, maintaining our technological superiority across the full spectrum of the battlefield, including space, is of major concern to the Army and a significant challenge in terms of convincing the national leadership as well as the American voter to fund, develop and field a technically superior force. Equally challenging; however, and probably just as important, are the requirements of preserving fundamental Army values and ensuring that we have trained leaders and technically competent soldiers who will be fully capable of waging war successfully on the modern technological battlefield, whether it be in space, the jungle or on the desert. LTC Robert Maginnis ("A chasm of Values") argues that certain fundamental Army values are time proven and that any significant departure from or abandonment of them could ultimately affect combat readiness. He attributes much of our success in the Gulf to a rediscovery and reaffirmation of these values, but notes, quoting Daniel Yankelovich, that "we now find our nation hovering midway between an older postwar faith in expanding horizons, and a new sense of lowered expectancy, apprehension about the future, mistrusts of institutions, and a growing sense of limits." Maginnis sees this as a major challenge for the Army during the coming decades, and persuasively argues that "[a] strong value system is the soul of the soldier and the Army he serves." While the technological challenges and the need to preserve values are significant issues, the single most important challenge, according to Magee ("Building Strategic Leadership for the 21st Century") is probably that of ensuring that our senior strategic leaders look to the future to ensure that the Army has trained leaders and technically competent soldiers. These strategic leaders must, according to Magee, possess above all else a vision for the organization and must be capable of shaping the culture of the organization to ensure that leaders and soldiers at every level are competent, trained, and ready to perform to the maximum in a volatile and changing battlefield environment. Indeed, Colonel Timmerman ("Future Warriors"), reminds us that war is a "human activity" and that our "future warriors" and their leaders must be of the highest caliber, the best trained, and the best led, for "[w]hat easier way to negate the effect of all super weapons than to render those who would employ them ineffective [because of poor leadership and training]."

Without doubt, the Persian Gulf War has had a major impact on military strategy and how weapons will be developed and employed on the future battlefield. Indeed, experts such as Klare ("Behind Desert Storm") predict that we will continue to consciously avoid being drawn into low intensity conflicts and will instead plan for and field a small but technologically superior force capable of waging and winning mid-intensity conflicts of the gulf variety. Some experts suggest, by the first decade of the 21st Century, such a force may be totally unified. While I see this as unlikely, it is clear that there will be an increased demand and need for the Army to recognize that space is, as General Horner notes, the "military's final frontier" and continue to take advantage of the full realm of strategic and tactical advantages inherent in the employment of space based systems. For the Army, this translates into continued support for and employment of an effective Ballistic Missile Defense system (improved Patriot in the near term) with long range capability to deter attacks by both terrorist groups and organized rogue governments alike. It also means continuing to take maximum advantage of satellite reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, weather monitoring, navigation, mapping and charting, and, probably most important of all, communications, to ensure that the ground commander has a clear and distinct advantage over his enemy in terms of ability to mass, concentrate firepower, and engage in the element of surprise. This is consistent with Army space policy as proposed in the final draft of FM 100-18 which is to focus "... on operational capabilities that will enable the military services to fulfill the national security objectives."

On the ground, the Army must continue to push for an air transportable light tank-killing vehicle, some type of effective shoulder-fired missile to replace the aging Dragon, and promote the need for continued upgrading of the TOW system. The Air Force's successful use of "smart bombs" and other kinetic energy missiles strongly supports an argument for employment of such systems in ground based weapons systems to give the soldier on the ground greater "smart" capability to defeat his enemy at even greater standoff range. These platforms are already in use or in the planning stage (e.g. the Tomahawk, Paveway III, SLAM and the HARM), and Army planners must continue to emphasize the absolute necessity of such technology if we are to maintain our superiority on the 21st century battlefield.